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"For a police officer to be justified in 
stopping a motor vehicle for purposes of 
investigation, the officer should be aware 
of facts upon which he can reasonably 
suspect that someone in the car is engaged 
in criminal activity." 
W.P. Baskin, III 
City Recorder 
Bishopville, South Carolina 
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SUSPECT VEHICLE ... 
INVESTIGATORY STOP 
(US v. Riaz, 524 F2d 118) 
A police officer on routine patrol duty in 
Miami, Florida, observed a black Chevrolet occupied 
by two black males. An armed robbery approximately 
a month earlier had resulted in an APB describing 
the culprits: 
"Two black males driving a 
blue or black Chevrolet." 
The place robbed was a Farm Stores, and there 
was a Farm Store in the neighborhood in which the 
officer spotted the suspect vehicle. 
The suspect car was stopped, and the two 
occupants gave conflicting stories as to what they 
were doing in the neighborhood. Both were arrested, 
one being charged with lying to a police officer 
(Miami City Code) and the other with unlawful 
loitering and prowling (Miami City Code). 
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During an inventory search of the vehicle, 
bank checks ... later found to have been stolen from 
the mails ••• were found in an unlocked glove compart-
ment. The two suspects were convicted of possession 
of the stolen checks. They appealed, arguing that 
the checks were discovered in the process of an 
unlawful search. A Federal Court of Appeals in New 
Orleans agreed, stating: 
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DID THE POLICE OFFICER HAVE 
GOOD REASON TO STOP RIAZ? 
"The courts have recognized the right of a 
police officer to stop and detain an individual 
under certain circumstances. 
"The circumstances required to justify such 
action, however, must be sufficient to enable a 
police officer reasonably to suspect that the 
particular individual is involved in criminal activity. 
"A brief stop of a suspicious individual, in 
order to determine his identity or to maintain the 
status quo momentarily while obtaining more infor-
mation, may be most reasonable in light of the facts 
known to the officer at the time. 
"In the instance case, the facts known to the 
officer at the time he stopped the defendant clearly 
did not rise to the required level, and in reality 
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were so tenuous as to provide virtually no grounds 
whatsoever for suspicion. The officer was unsure 
whether the automobile used in the robberies was 
black or blue; the only description of the robbers 
was that they were black males; the last armed 
robbery of which he had any knowledge had occurred 
at least two weeks, and possibly a month, earlier; 
it was not unusual for blacks to be seen in the area; 
it was midday; the suspects made no attempt to flee. 
In short, the officer simply stopped two black males 
because they were in a black Chevrolet. This fact 
alone, without additional reliable evidence sufficient 
to warrant the conclusion that either or both of the 
men had been or were involved in criminal activity, 
did not constitute cause to stop the vehicle." 
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REASON FOR RULING 
"Were we to fail, on these facts; to condemn 
the actions of the officer in stopping and arresting 
Riaz, there would remain virtually no limitations on 
the power of the police to stop, arrest, and search 
citizens and their vehicles and then use any 
incriminating evidence they may find in a court of 
law. Such unbridled license would effectively 
eliminate from the Constitution the Fourth Amendment 
protection afforded citizens in public places. That 
is a result which we cannot condone. 
"Reversed." 
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CONSENT SEARCH ... 
(1) EFFECT OF 
POLICE PRESENCE 
(2) PARENT'S RIGHT 
TO CONSENT 
-11- -12-
BEDROOM SEARCH ... conviction, appeal was taken, it being argued that 
(1) Police Presence the mother could not give permission to search her 
(2) Parent's Right to Consent 
son's bedroom, and, even if such search was lawful, 
(US v. Peterson, 524 F2d 167) 
that the presence of several police officers when 
they asked permission to search intimidated the 
Robbery of a bank in Alexandria, Virginia, had 
mother so that her consent was not voluntarily given. 
taken place and police suspected Stanley Peterson, 
The Court's rulings: 
who lived in a house rented by his mother. Stanley, 
with his two brothers, occupied one bedroom of the 
house, while the mother occupied the other. The 
mother was head of the household and paid the rent. 
There being insufficient grounds upon which to 
obtain a search warrant, the officers went to the 
Peterson home and talked with the mother. Neither 
Stanley nor either of his brothers was at home. 
The mother gave her consent to search of the house, 
including Stanley Peterson's bedroom. 
Evidence of the robbery was found in Stanley 
Peterson's bedroom and was used at trial. After 
-13-
MOTHER'S RIGHT TO CONSENT 
TO SEARCH OF SON'S BEDROOM 
''In this case, the home searched was that of 
the mother. She maintained it as a family home. 
She made it available to all her children living at 
home with her, including Stanley Peterson. All the 
children recognized it as belonging to the mother 
and as being under her 11 control''. That was the 
basis given by the daughter who, in refusing to give 
her consent, told the police that only her mother 
had the authority to consent to a search. 
11 Had the issue been presented to us initially, 
we would have concluded the search valid as to Stanle 
Peterson. We find particularly persuasive in arriving 
at that result. Mr. Justice (then Circuit Judge) 
Blackmun, upholding the right of a mother to consent 
to a search of a room in the home shared, as here, 
by the defendant with his two younger brothers, said 
(pp.336-37): 
, 
I 
'3 
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11What then, is the effect of this voluntary 
consent on the part of Maxwell's mother? We 
recognize, of course, that constitutional rights 
are not to depend upon 'subtle di3tinctions, 
developed and refined by the common law in evolving 
the body of private property law.' Jones v. United 
States, supra, 362U.S. 257,266, 80S.Ct. 725,733, 4 
1. Ed. 2d 697, 733 (1960). But this is not a case of 
property right distinctions. The defense concedes 
that Mrs. Maxwell possessed a proprietary interest 
in the house; that Maxwell himself only shared a 
room there with his two younger brothers; and that 
no landlord-tenant relationship existed between 
Maxwell and his parents. Mrs. Maxwell had control 
of the premises, undiminished by any kind of less-
than-fee interest possessed by Maxwell. This fact 
stands in contrast to the hotel or rental situations. 
(Citations omitted.) The situation strikes us as 
being no different, factually, than if Mrs. Maxwell 
herself had brought ~·, ~·, ~·, (the seized item), it 
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being properly in her possession, to the authorities. 
They came to the home, it is true, but they obtained 
* * * (it) by freely allowed access to the home * * 
·;'( " 
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DID PRESENCE OF POLICE 
INTIMIDATE THE MOTHER? 
"On appeal the appellants redouble their efforts 
in an attempt to persuade us that the District Court 
erred in finding that Mrs. Peterson's consent was 
freely and voluntarily given. This, however, is a 
factual question, to be determined by the trier of 
fact in light of the "totality of all the surrounding 
circumstances" and is binding on us unless clearly 
erroneous. Schneckloth v. Bustamante (1973) 412 U.S. 
218, 226, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2047,36 L.Ed. 2d 854. 
Manifestly, the mere presence of police officers in 
the Peterson home, absent any indication of coercive 
words or acts on their part, is insufficient to 
raise an inference that Mrs. Peterson's consent was 
an unwitting and unwilling submission to police 
authority." 
The convictions were upheld. 
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SEARCH OF HOUSE ... 
CONSENT OF WIFE 
-18-
SEARCH OF RESIDENCE ... 
CONSENT BY ESTRANGED WIFE 
(US v. Long, 524 F2d 660) 
Police got 'street' talk that a suspect, Long, 
had made an unlawful purchase of pistols. Long was 
a convicted felon and could not lawfully purchase 
the weapons. There were no facts known to police 
upon which a search warrant could be obtained. 
Long's wife had moved out of the house she had 
occupied with her husband a few days before, because 
of fear of Long, and had moved to other quarters. 
Police persuaded the wife to go to her husband's 
house with them and give them consent to search it. 
She consented and accompanied them. Long had 
changed the locks. It was necessary that they break 
in. They did. The house was searched and two 
pistols found. They were traced by serial numbers 
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to Long, who had purchased them unlawfully under an 
assumed name. Long was convicted on two counts of 
unlawfully buying the pistols. He appealed, arguing 
that the search was unlawful because there was no 
search warrant and contending that his wife could 
not give her consent to the search because she had 
moved out of the house and no longer occupied it 
jointly with him. The Court, in an opinion by Judge 
Donald Russell, said: 
-20-
"Long first claims that his conviction should 
be reversed because it is based on evidence which 
is the product of illegal searches. It is asserted 
that Mrs. Long could not give a valid consent to 
search the house because she did not have joint 
access or control of the house within the meaning 
of United States v. Matlock, 415U.S. 164, 17ln. 7, 
94 S.Ct. 988, 39 L.Ed. 2d 242 (1974). It cannot be 
convincingly argued that Mrs. Long as a joint owner 
of the house did not have the right to enter the 
house. Her husband was not her lessee who had the 
exclusive right of possession of the house. They 
had shared it until Mrs. Long was forced to leave 
due to her fear of her husband. Mrs. Long had a 
joint right to control the house with her husband 
and in fact exercised that right at the times she 
accompanied the agents to the house by collecting 
her personal belongings from the house while the 
agents were conducting the searches. Mrs. Long's 
consent was valid." 
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FLEMING'S NOTEBOOK! 
-~~ -~,~- ] 
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FLEMING'S NOTEBOOK ... Chapter 121: 
RICHLAND COUNTY COURT MAY NOT ACT IN 
STATEWIDE MATTER (BREATHALYZER TEST) 
The South Carol,ina ·Supreme Court has held that 
~~ 
the Richland County Court does not have the power to 
restrain the South Carolina State Highway Department 
from suspending a driver license for refusal to take 
a breathalyzer test. 
In a January 20, 1976 decision, the Supreme 
Court reversed the action of the Richland County 
Court, stating that the County Court was not 
empowered to interfere in the matter at all. 
Harden v. State Hwy Dept. et al, No.20 148, filed 
January 20, 1976. 
Harden had refused to take the breathalyzer 
test and his license was suspended. The County 
-23-
Court issued its order reversing the Department 
and restraining it from effecting further suspension. 
The Department appealed. The Supreme Court then 
reversed the County Court, holding: 
-24-
"The appellant is ..• an agency of the State 
government performing statewide functions. The 
jurisdiction of the Richland County Court is 
limited to Richland County; and it necessarily 
follows that Section 15-764, supra, only grants to 
Richland County Court concurrent jurisdiction with 
the circuit court in such matters in Richland 
County. As such court of limited jurisdiction, it 
has no authority to restrain or direct appellant 
in the performance of his duties for the State 
government. Any other holding would extend the 
jurisdiction of the county court beyond its 
territorial limits and confer upon it the authority 
to restrain statewide governmental activities." 
30 ••• EFM 
STATEWIDE LAW ENFORCEMENT TRAINING 
THROUGH TELEVISION 
S.C. Law Enforcement Training 
Council Members 
J.P. Strom- Chairman 
Charles Dawley 
L.E. Simmons 
James Metts 
Joseph Loeffler 
Daniel R. McLeod 
P.F. Thompson 
Dr. James A. Timmerman, Jr. 
William D. Leeke 
Robert W. Foster 
James L. Anderson 
James P. Ashmore 
Clifford A. Moyer -Executive Director 
S.C. Criminal Justice Academy 
S.
C
.
 
E
T
V
 
N
E
T
W
O
R
K
 
2
7
1
2
 
M
i
l
l
w
o
o
d
 
A
v
e
n
u
e
 
P
 
.
0
.
 
D
r
a
w
e
r
 
L
 
C
o
l
u
m
b
i
a
,
 
S
o
u
t
h
 
C
a
r
o
l
i
n
a
 
2
9
2
5
0
 
l
i
o
n
.
 
D
a
n
 
M
c
L
e
o
d
 
s
.
 
c
.
 
A
t
t
o
r
n
e
y
 
G
e
n
e
r
a
l
 
C
o
l
m
n
b
i
a
,
 
S
.
C
.
 
2
9
2
0
5
 
L
A
W
 
N
o
n
p
r
o
f
i
t
 
O
r
g
a
n
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
 
U
.
S
.
 
P
o
s
t
a
g
e
 
P
A
I
D
 
C
o
l
u
m
b
i
a
,
 
S
.
C
.
 
P
e
r
m
i
t
 
N
o
.
 
1
0
6
1
 
